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PROFESSOR M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*

The Middle East In Transition:
From War To War,
A Proposed Solution
The Framework of Resolution 242, the United Nations and International Law
The night of November 22, 1967, witnessed the relief of those who in
New York had diligently worked out the drafting and adoption of U.N.
Res. 242. It was theoretically the beginning of peace; in fact it marked the
transition between blitzkreig-like war and war of attrition. It was thought of
by its framers as a cut-off point so as to serve as a new plateau from which
to start substantive peaceful settlement. It was indeed a new departure
point; but like many paradoxes in history, it was the start of something
wholly different from its originally intended purpose.
As most U.N. products, this one was the off-spring of political compromise hammered out by multiple parties who pursued varying purposes.
As such, it fed with a measured dose of equanimity the opposing contentions it was to resolve. Unavoidably, it enunciated irreconcilable propositions and, thus, bore the seeds of its own ill fate.
The value-oriented goal which characterized this crisis-product is
two-fold:
1. It was designed to demonstrate the role and ability of the U.N. in
peacekeeping.
2. It was aimed at creating a spirit of world moral sanction which
through the marshalling of world public opinion would lead to a world
societal pressure on the parties concerned to achieve a peaceful settlement.
This approach has also characterized many a similar product of world
political compromise. The discerning reader of the 1954 Geneva Accords
could see that it was a "rain check" and foresee that it was not an end but a
transition to the Viet Nam of today, which found its new plateau in the
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terms of the Geneva Accords; that much is true about Resolution 242. If
we examine the resumption of military activities in the Middle East, we can
observe the correlation between the ever-increasing tempo of hostilities
and the gradual realization by the parties of the failure of Resolution 242.
On both sides hostilities are not yet in the nature of all-out war, but they
pursue a strategy of attrition which will last and escalate until full-fledged
warring operations resume more decisively. Interestingly enough, neither
Viet Nam nor the Middle East has reverted to nonpeaceful means on the
basis of their historical arguments, but on the grounds that the conditions
or terms of the "new plateau," i.e., the Geneva Accords in one case and
Resolution 242 in the other, have not been complied with or have been
violated. Each side, of course, accusing the other of the same and traditional arguments fade away in light of the new declarations.
Conflicts are not resolved by emphasizing the rights or righteousness of
the opposing parties, but by drawing distinctions between them. Furthermore, those distinctions must rest on the relatively impartial and objective
Rule of Law. Political compromises are only a substitute for a legally based
determination of the respective rights and duties of any opposing parties
when they themselves are parties to the compromising process and their
acceptance thereof takes the place of the legal determination. Where mutual consent and voluntariness lacks, there is no substitute for the Rule of
Law. The remaining alternative is the Rule of Force. Failure to accept this
premise will further the perpetuation of such pronouncements as Resolution 242, which in seeking to declare has avoided to resolve, and in arriving
at its compromise has evaded to determine the respective rights and duties
of all the parties concerned. At best it has armed them with renewed
justification while putting another nail to the coffin of the peaceful resolution of this conflict.
What is maybe so disconcerting in the development of this conflict is
that almost all of its ingredients are predicated on legal questions which are
indeed resolvable in their entirety by international law. The seeming inability to reach a juridical solution is symptomatic of the dichotomy between law in theory and practice. To the non-Western world which has
adhered to international law and which rightfully regards it as the produce
of Western thought, it is inconceivable why that which is considered as the
foundation of world order is relegated behind a wall of self-imposed undiscerning political pragmatism. It is not of legal realism that I speak, but of
the dual standards of application of international law which manifest the
unabashed hypocrisy of its Western framers. Those familiar with the legal
issues of this conflict will readily recognize this unfortunate fact, and
Resolution 242 leaves no doubt about it, as I hope to show later. Prior to
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that, an examination of the inarticulated premise of the "resolution" will
reveal the extent to which the above statements are believed to be true by
the non-Western world in general and the Arab world in particular.
Aligning the Parties
This premise is predicted on some basic misconceptions which the U.N.
and the U.S. have, for known political reasons, assumed or accepted as
valid. They are primarily in an area which this distinguished group will not
fail to see as being the outcome determinative factor which shaped the
framing of the "resolution" and, in general, U.S. policy. It starts with the
caption of the case, the proper relationship of the parties and the framing of
the issues.
So far, the case has been captioned as:
The case of righteous and valiant David struggling
-

versus

-

The aggressive, hate-ridden, destruction-bent Goliath.
The parties have been:
The Arabs on one side-the Jews on the other
The issue has been framed as such:
Should the world stand still before the avowed intentions of 100
million primitive aggressors bent on the barbarous annihilation of the
peaceable peace-loving, many times victimized, two and a half million
people of Israel?
But let the caption be:
The case of forcefully displaced Palestinian people, et. al.
-

versus

-

The foreign invaders and occupiers of their homeland.
Frame the issue in terms of:
Should two million Europeans from various nationality origins, who
having suffered at the hands of other Europeans, be allowed to take
over the land of Palestine, destroy the existing state, occupy the
property of the inhabitants and deny them the right to nationhood,
while flouting U.N. resolutions and ever-expanding territorially by use
of force at the neighboring states.
In the captioning of the case, I referred to Palestinian people, et. al. as
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the real Party-Plaintiffs. Indeed a distinction exists between the Palestinian
people and some directly interested Arab states, one that is invariably
blurred by the news media of this country which is all too often one-sided
and superficial. To the media, it is the "Arabs." No distinctions drawn-no
definitions given-no issues segregated-no interests isolated. One advantage I suppose is the creation of a new stereotype image of the enrobed,
veiled, shadowy bad-guy, ready to steal away in the night after treacherously stabbing someone in the back. After all, Indians and Blacks are out;
maybe it is time for a change of scene and the "Arab" can be it. Soon, we,
may even see on the late show how the uprising on the desert reservation
of the unruly refugees is crushed by the mystical pioneer one-eyed hero.
To isolate the parties and issues is a foremost consideration without
which we cannot understand let alone resolve the problem.
The primary parties are the Palestinian people who have been denied
nationhood, stripped of human rights and dignity and denied their property-all in violation of international law, world human rights and several
specific U.N. resolutions. Theirs' is a quest for nationhood which is confronted by a unique and dangerous political dogma-Zionism-Zionism
which occupied their homeland under the guise that "Palestine was a
country without people" and that it was befitting that it be occupied "by a
people without a country." In 1948, close to 700,000 and by 1967
1,350,000 refugees attested to the fact that they had become a people
without a country. With respect to that issue, Arab states are only
third-party intervenors even though with respect to their territorial boundaries dispute with Israel they are primary parties.
The Territorial Issue and Resolution 242
Since a starting point is necessary for a logical chronology of the interplay of events and the respective rights and duties of the parties, I will
arguendo elect the 1947 U.N. partition plan which created a Jewish and an
Arab state of Palestine. I said arguendo because there is much doubt about
the legitimacy of this U.N. Salomonian justice of splitting in halves a
"provisionally independent state" under the League of Nations' Mandate
and its successor trusteeship Articles of the United Nations' Charter
without regard to the principle of national self-determination (since the
decision was arrived at by the General Assembly of the U.N. in New York
and not by the choice of the people of Palestine). Assuming, however, the
validity of this decision, then any and all territory exceeding the allotted
territory of the U.N. partition which was acquired by Israel through military conquest is in direct violation of international law and must be relinquished by Israel. This would apply to territory which under the Partition
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Plan belongs to the then proposed Arab state of Palestine and, subsequently (as of 1967) to territory belonging to the surrounding Arab
states.
Indeed, Resolution 242 emphatically states:
"Emphasizing:
"The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war..."
"1. Affirms:
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in the
recent conflict ..."
The first quoted part which refers to the inadmissibility of territorial
acquisition by war is a well-established principle of international law over
which this country went to war in the two World Wars, in Korea and
nowadays in Viet Nam. The second quotation affirms the need for withdrawal but limits it to territory occupied in the "recent conflicts" while in
the same Paragraph 1 under (ii) it affirms the right of all states to live
"within secure and recognized borders." If the first principle of illegitimacy
and invalidity of forceful acquisition of territory is applied, then no negotiated or agreed boundaries are necessary since a return to the U.N.
established boundaries of 1947 would do. The 1967 Resolution, however,
speaks rather clearly of the pre-1967 boundaries and, thus, implicitly of the
post-armistice lines of 1948-49 and not of the same U.N. established 1947
boundaries.
Thus, it latently condones by specific and intentional omission post-1947
expansions, while rejecting post-1967 expansions subject to the irreconcilable caveat of "secure and recognized boundaries" which by obvious
implication are to be agreed upon and subject to territorial withholdings
from that same territory which, it is emphasized, cannot be acquired by
force.
The rather disconcerting effort by the U.N. of paying lip service to a
fundamental principle of law while underhandedly encouraging and even
justifying Israel to hold out until it can "agree" to carve out a "secure and
recognized" share is the surest way of pitting opposing sides more drastically against each other. There is no alternative to this dilemma in which
the Arab states can legitimately claim unconditional return of their territory
and the claim of Israel to "secure and recognized borders" extending
beyond the pre-1967 boundaries or for that matter to any territory exceeding the 1947 U.N. established ones. The outcome of the dilemma is
the intransigent entrenchment of each side behind a portion of the resolution ignoring the others for obvious reasons. Meanwhile the tempo of
hostilities is climbing back to the crisis proportion which would again make
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2
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it U.N. noteworthy. To ask which of the two conflicting aspects of the
resolution shall be obeyed first or which shall be complied with before the
other (or not withstanding the other) is also to ask whether Resolution 242
is recommandatory or resolutory. With respect to peacekeeping, U.N.
resolutions are resolutory. What then of a resolution phrased in the contradictory meaning described? Is it to be considered recommandatory, in
which case no sanctions under the United Nations' Charter can ensue from
its flouting. To that extent the "resolution" stands out as a sacrificial
offering to political hypocrisy on the altar of effective peaceful resolution of
world conflicts.
The Palestinian People Issue and Resolution 242
As early as 1948, the U.N. in another unfulfilled resolution (Res.
194-1948), declared the Palestinian people's right to return to their homeland. As their state was destroyed and their right to return abridged, they
were the object of what Aba Eban in the opposite context once aptly
dubbed "politicide."
Since 1948, it is a harsh realization to recall that such world human
rights as expressed in the Universal Declaration, the Civil and Political
Rights Covenant and the United Nations' Charter trusteeship obligations
have yet to be even considered for application to the Palestinians-the
people without a country and without remedy to otherwise theoretically
existing rights which remain wronged without apparent redress.
To their claim of nationhood, Resolution 242 answers in its second
operative paragraph:
"Affirms further, the necessity...
"(c) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem
(Emphasis)

..

Constitutionally, this obscure pronouncement signifies the death certificate of Palestinian national claims as a separate national entity or as a
bi-nationhood claim for a bi-national state as originally designed by the
same U.N. in 1947. It does not even contemplate a secular Israeli state as
a successor state to Palestine with a bi-ethnic composition. Indeed it has
reduced a once proud people and a nation to a tent dwelling and exiled
people whose only recognized claim is to refugeeism and statelessness
deserving only the fate of the least recognized elementary humane considerations.
Little wonder that the Palestinians who had entrusted themselves to the
fairness of the U.N. at first, then to the benevolent but unsuccessful
assistance of their Arab brethren have no other alternative but to assert
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their presence and press their claims by guerrilla-like liberation tactics. To
that extent, Resolution 242 not only failed to see that the primary party
and the primary issue is the Palestinian people's claim to nationhood; but it
reduced that claim to a mere refugee question without regard to prior U.N.
resolutions and in effect drove the Palestinians to an awakening war of
liberation. What may have been intended to be their epitaph has sounded
their revival.
The Political Issue
Politically, the issue is Zionism versus Arab national secularism. The
exclusion of Palestinians from that which is now Israel is a direct consequence of the "in-gathering" policy of that State. The need and rationalzation for territorial expansion are derivative from the same in-gathering
policy, while the desire not to assimilate within the Arab world is to
maintain the racist characteristic which is indispensible for the attraction of
Jewish immigrants. Unfortunately, time does not permit a discussion of
Zionism and its application in Israel and vis d vis the Palestinians and
neighboring Arab states. Essentially, we are dealing with a racist manifestation predicated on a political dogma labelled "the Jewish People" which
seeks to impose itself on all Jews of the world and claims their allegiance to
the political State of Israel in exchange for their "right to return" to it.
Aside from its difficulties with nationality law, the concept is theoretically
irreconcilable with Arab national secularism. This latter is marching at a
rapid pace toward the establishment of an Arab nation which is representative of the trend in world regionalism. A Zionist Israel is geographically
and politically disruptive of this regional goal which is as natural as is a
European community and American federalism.
The failure to understand this natural and historical process will dim the
perception of the significance of any impediments to its attainment. Erecting any barriers to its ultimate achievement, even though it now appears
remote, will cause in the present disruptions of the peace and tranquility of
the area. In this context, two factors are most relevant:
1. The gradual de-Zionisation of Israel, and
2. The Arab revolution.
The first is a characteristic that depends on the demographic change that
is taking place in Israel. As the number of Israelis from Arab origin
increases and the second generation Israelis become more removed from
their European origins, a national sentiment will develop which will link
Israel to its natural and geographic setting and gradually effect its re-entry
in the Arab orbit. As Israel breaks its bonds with American and European
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Zionism, it will establish its natural and historical ties with the Arab world
of which it is, as it has always been, an integral part thereof. This is not to
say that local characteristics are not to continue to prevail but that will be
the same as exists in any other region of the Arab world and will not
hamper the overall regional attachment. The Arabization of Israel does not
mean its cultural, spiritual or religious extinction but its political assimilation in the regional framework.
The second factor, or the Arab revolution, is one that deals with the rising
expectations of Arab peoples throughout the Arab world. These peoples
are the subject in varying degrees to the same modern nationalistic progressive tendencies which have characterized many a country that has emerged
into the modern industrialized and developed stage. This process by its
very nature is painful and uneven; but soon it will envelop the whole of the
Arab world. Already we can see its path laid out as millions of Arabs cast
away old ways and traditions-some inherited and some inculcated by
foreign influences-to acquire the new characteristics of politically emerging, economically developing, eager to acquire their place as full-fledged
members of the world community. More significant, however, are the
socio-political changes which are occurring within the Arab states. Indeed
Israel's shifting Zionist philosophy and Arab revolutionarism are internal
processes and they will not be without their growing pains, but both are
part of the inevitable historical course and destiny of that area. If and when
time will have been permitted to allow these processes to take their
courses, they will level off and reach a certain plateau from where ideological barriers will fade while differences will wither away.
Proposal For The Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict.
Most issues which confront Israel and some Arab states are either
derivative of the Palestinian question or flow from the ideological confrontation of the vestiges of open-ended Zionism versus Arab national
secularism. This latter factor will, in time, wither away; and time is,
therefore, of the essence. In the history of world conflicts, ideologies alone
never produced violent confrontations without the existence of situational
factors to trigger them off. Opposing ideologies may be explosive but they
cannot blast without detonators. To eliminate the situational factors of this
conflict would require a time sequence which I suggest to be as follows:
1. The evacuation by Israel of all the 1967 occupied territories, subject
only to the condition of U.N. peacekeeping forces to supervise and guard
the 1948-49 armistice lines with potentially U.N. negotiated demilitarized
areas.
2. The recognition of the Right of the Palestinian people to nationhood
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2
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which, in a second phase, would require negotiations by the representatives
of the Palestinian people, Israel and interested Arab governments to implement such a Right.
3. The submission of all pending issues to the International Court of
Justice.
In accordance with this paragraph an Ad Hoc Rule of Law Commission
for PermanentArab-IsraeliPeace was formed in 1968 which submitted the
following proposal to the Secretary-General of the U.N. who has circulated
it to the Security Council as Doc. 5/NC/188, July 17, 1968. The same
document was sent to all heads of State of interested nations. It states:
"The mandate granted by the League of Nations to Great Britain over the
'Provisionally Independent State of Palestine' to oversee its acceding to
full independence ended when the mandator offered to terminate the mandate and submitted the question to the United Nations in 1947. To provide
a solution for the troubled area, the United Nations decided to partition
Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish State. The Arab population rejected
the decision and an armed dispute ensued which subsequently caused other
Arab States to enter the arena.
Between 1948 and 1949, armistice agreements, establishing cease-fire
lines between the disputants, were entered into by and between Israel,
Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Israel's independence was proclaimed
in 1948 and subsequently Israel was admitted tolthe United Nations. The
Arab States disclaimed the international status of Israel.
The problems of the Palestinian Arabs and particularly their return or
re-settlement and compensation for their property, remain unsolved. Israeli
ships have been denied access through the Suez Canal and sporadically
through the Gulf of Aquaba on grounds of a continued 'state of war.' The
tension between Arab States and the State of Israel continued to grow
culminating in the 1956 Israeli attack on Egypt and the 1967 hostilities
between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq. This resulted in additionally
lost Arab territory and more Arab refugees without fulfilling Israel's need
for national security.
From June 1967 to this date, no sign of peaceful resolution emerged, and
the November 22nd United Nations Security Council Resolution 242
failed in its purpose. The present situation may lead to further hostilities.
The undersigned, in the belief that peace can be attained only if it is based
on the supremacy of the Rule of Law displacing the threat of force, submit
the following:
Resolution
WHEREAS the dispute between Arab States and the State of Israel
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has continued to pose a threat to those nations' peace and tranquility
and to the world; and
WHEREAS no peace efforts have brought the parties any closer to a
permanent and just solution;
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED:
I. To urge the parties and the international community to consider
this question as a challenge to their ability to achieve peaceful solution
of the world problems under the Rule of Law and to seize upon this
opportunity to implement the Rule of Law by peaceful procedures.
2. To request the parties to submit their dispute, which has many legal
aspects requiring judicial determination before any political adjustments can be made between them, to the worldwide impartial legal
organ the world community has so far devised: The International
Court of Justice.
3. To appeal to the United States and to their international community of nations to use their good offices directly and through the United
Nations to bring about an agreement of the parties to submit to the
Court's jurisdiction; to ask the United Nations to exert pressure on
the parties in order to make them sign a protocol submitting all legal
issues pending between them to the Court's determination before any
further steps to settle the problem are taken. The suggested protocol of
issues to be submitted to the Court should include, but should not be
limited to, the following:
A. The principle of sovereignty, independence and intregity of all
parties involved as the basis for any settlement, legal or political,
and the termination de jure of the "state of belligerency."
B. The determination under the principles of International Law, the
United Nations' Charter and the United Nations' resolutions of the
permanent borders of Israel as international borders entitled to the
safety and security guaranteed by the United Nations' Charter and
International Law (inviting pre-trial conferences between the parties
for mutually agreed border adjustments basically serving the national interests of the parties involved).
C. The refugees' problem of returning and of obtaining adequate
compensation must be established on the basis of the United Nations' resolutions and equitable stipulations by and between the
parties under the auspices of the Court.
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D. The right of the State of Israel to free and innocent passage
through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aquaba.
E. The establishment of a "Commission" acting as an arm of the
Court and appointed by the Court to hold pre-trial conferences
with all parties to narrow the issues and organize the presentation
of the case so as to avoid duplication and spurious arguments.
The said "Commission" should be empowered to act as an independent fact finder for the Court to settle disputed questions of
fact. The "Commission" should continue after the Court's decision
is rendered to oversee the implementation of the Court's Orders as
part of the Secretary General's staff.
The parties should agree to submit any differences between
them arising out of the work of the said "Commission" first to the
"Commission" itself and, in the second instance, to raise them
before the Court.
F. The imposition on all parties of a permanent injunction not to
threaten the sovereignty and territorial and political integrity of
any party.
4. To call all interested parties to submit to the Court; and to encourage other nations to submit Amicus Curiae positions even though they
will not be deemed interested parties.
5. To ask the United Nations to promptly extend financial support to
the Court's "Commission," so that the determination by the Court
may be reached without unnecessary delay.
The signatories of this resolution express their belief that a legal process
is possible in this case and their hope that the parties and the international
community will elect to avail themselves of it.
The undersigned submit this resolution to the President of the United
States and the Secretary General of the United Nations urging them to
exercise every possible effort to bring about a peaceful settlement of the
dispute by procedures in conformity with the Rule of Law, thus removing
the decision-making process from the parties and placing it in the hands of
the impartial and unimpeachable international forum. In addition, these
procedures would afford the disputants the invaluable opportunity of meeting on neutral grounds to discuss their grievances, dispel doubts and
stipulate to agreed questions without any one party feeling that it was
forced into submission by the opposing State. All political issues thereafter
still pending will, we hope, find a better climate of understanding and
cooperation and their solution more probable."
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The document was signed by this author as Chairman Pro-Tem and
was endorsed by the following Professors of Law: Samuel Bleicher (Toledo), Brendan Brown (Loyola, New Orleans), William Cunningham
(Loyola, Chicago), Peter Donnici (San Francisco), George Garbesi
(Loyola, L.A.) Luis Kutner, Kenneth Levan (Indianapolis), Marcellus
Meek (John Marshall), Cornelius Murphy (Duquesne), John Murray
(Georgia), Ved Nanda (Denver), Oliver Schroeder (Case Western Reserve), Prakash Sinha (South Dakota, Jerome Sloan (Temple), John Stoepier (Toledo) and Wence Wagner (Indiana). It was also endorsed in spirit
by Neill Alford (Virginia) and Charles Kelso (then Miami, presently Indianapolis).
This author wishes to express his gratitude to all those named above
and emphasize that this article in no way represents their views but exclusively his own. The responses received were from then Ambassador
Arthur Goldberg and Assistant Secretary of State Lucius Battle for the
United States and H. M. King Hussein of Jordan. Only this latter was in
any way encouraging.
In order to start implementing this proposal, it is further suggested
that the President of the United States offer his good offices to all parties
concerned so as to clear the path of all practical, diplomatic and protocol
matters preceding the acceptance of this proposal and its actual initiation.
Conclusion
A revealing historical paradox deserves thoughtful consideration. For
years in the pogroms and ghettos of Europe, helpless Jews kept the spark
of hope by wishing each other: "Next year in Jerusalem." It was indeed a
sign of hope evoking the image of a peaceful heaven from European
persecution. Today, the very same words are the rallying cry of dispossessed and hopeless camp-dwelling Palestinian refugees and exiles.
So far the fate of Jerusalem-this heaven of peace-this cradle of civilization which harbored the origin of the three major religions of man-has
been decided by the force of arms.
Should it continue to see its fate determined by the Rule of Might or by
the Rule of Law?
This is the unanswered question and so far the challenge which mankind
continues to ignore with frightening indifference.
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